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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Clayton Adams appeals following the district court’s denial of his motion for credit 
for time served.  Mr. Adams asserts that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion requesting credit for time served on his aggravated battery sentence.  When 
Mr. Adams was sentenced in 2007, the conviction for aggravated battery was ordered to 
be served consecutively to the conviction for second degree murder, but the sentence 
for second degree murder was subsequently vacated by the district court as part of 
Mr. Adams’ post-conviction relief.  When the sentence was vacated, the consecutive 
nature of his sentences ended as there was no sentence to which the aggravated 
battery could be consecutive.  At Mr. Adams’ re-sentencing on the second degree 
murder charge in 2014, the district court did not specify whether the new second degree 
murder sentence was consecutive to, or concurrent to, the aggravated battery charge.  
Thus, the sentences are concurrent and Mr. Adams is owed credit for time served for 
the aggravated battery conviction.   
 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings  
In 2007, Mr. Adams was charged by Information with the following crimes:  1) 
one count of first degree murder committed in the course of a felony, or alternatively, 
through premeditation; 2) one count of aggravated battery; and 3) three counts of 
attempted robbery.  (R.34220, pp.27-31.)1  The case proceeded to a jury trial.  
                                            
1 This Court took judicial notice of the transcripts and record from Mr. Adams’ appeal in 
S.C. Docket No. 34220 and augmented the record on appeal to include the Clerk’s 
Record, Reporter’s Transcripts and Exhibits filed in prior appeal No. 42667.  For ease of 
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(R.34220, pp.112-156.)  The jury ultimately acquitted Mr. Adams of all three counts of 
attempted robbery, acquitted him of the murder in the first degree charge under both 
theories, found him guilty of the lesser charge of second degree murder, and found him 
guilty of aggravated battery.  (R.34220, pp.157-161.)   
On May 8, 2007, the district court sentenced Mr. Adams to life, with twenty-five 
years fixed, for the second degree murder and to ten years, with three years fixed, for 
the aggravated battery.  (5/8/07 Tr., p.112, L.24 – p.113, L.13; R.34220, pp.172-173.)  
The aggravated battery charge was ordered to be served consecutive to the second 
degree murder charge, for an aggregate sentence of life, with twenty-eight years fixed.  
(5/8/07 Tr., p.113, Ls.7-13; R.34220, pp.172-173.)  The district court entered a written 
judgment of conviction which provided that Mr. Adams’ sentences on each count “to run 
consecutively.”  (R., p.34; R.34220, pp.172-173.)   
In 2010, Mr. Adams filed a post-conviction petition.  (R.42920,2 pp.12-1473, 
1641-1694.)  The district court partially granted Mr. Adam’s petition for post-conviction 
relief, finding Mr. Adams had been misinformed as to the possible penalties for second 
degree murder.  (R.42920, pp.1894-1895 (incorporating the oral findings of fact and 
conclusions of law made during hearing on 6/23/14 Tr.); R. 42667, pp.34-36, 45-47, 
116-117.)  The district court’s summary dismissal and re-sentencing orders vacated 
Mr. Adams’ sentence on the second degree murder, and the district court set a re-
sentencing hearing.  (R.42920, pp.1894-1895, 1908-1909, 1933; 6/23/14 Tr., p.82, L.23 
                                                                                                                                            
reference, the record in each underlying appeal will be cited herein as “(R.34220, p.)” or 
“(R.42667, p.).”  (R., p.75.) 
2 Mr. Adams filed a motion asking this Court to take judicial notice of its file in the appeal 
in his post-conviction case, Adams v. State, S.C. Docket No. 42920.  References herein 
to documents in the Clerk’s Record shall be to “(R.42920, p.).” 
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– p.84, L.6; p.87, Ls.8-24.)  On October 15, 2014, the district court re-sentenced 
Mr. Adams on the second degree murder to life, with twenty-five years fixed.  (10/15/14 
Tr. p.99, Ls.1-5.)  At the re-sentencing, the district court was silent on whether the 
sentence was to be served concurrent with the aggravated battery sentence or 
consecutive to the aggravated battery sentence.  (10/15/14 Tr.)  The written Amended 
Judgment of Conviction on the second degree murder did not specify concurrent or 
consecutive service of the sentence, but provided, “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 
sentence previously imposed on May 8, 2007, with regards to the charge of Aggravated 
Battery in Count II, and as set forth in the Judgment and Commitment filed May 15, 
2007, shall remain as reflected in said judgment.”  (R., p.32.)  Mr. Adams timely 
appealed and asserted on appeal that his sentence was excessive.  (R.42667, pp.131-
134.)  The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence in an unpublished opinion, 
State v. Adams, 2015 WL 4740372 (Ct. App. 2015). 
On November 2, 2015, Mr. Adams filed a Motion for Credit for Time Served and 
a supporting memorandum in which he asserted that he should receive credit for all of 
the time served on both of the two counts for which he was convicted.  (R., pp.25-65.)  
Mr. Adams asserted that when he was re-sentenced on the second degree murder 
conviction, the district court did not make the sentence consecutive thus it was 
concurrent and he was entitled to credit for the time he spent in custody.  (R., pp.25-65.)  
Alternatively, Mr. Adams asked that the Judgment be corrected pursuant to I.C.R. 36, 
as a clerical error.  (R., p.25.)        
 The district court denied Mr. Adams’ motion without a hearing.  (R., pp.66-67.)   
The district court denied Mr. Adams’ motion, seeking “to void or correct his sentence for 
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Aggravated Battery.”  (R., p.66.)  The district court held that because Mr. Adams was 
never granted post-conviction relief consisting of a re-sentencing on the charge of 
Aggravated Battery, there was no merit to his reliance on State v. Drier, 139 Idaho 246 
(Ct. App. 2003).  Mr. Adams filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s order 














 Mr. Adams asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for 
credit for time served.  Although Mr. Adams’ sentence on the conviction for aggravated 
battery was initially ordered to run consecutively to the conviction for second degree 
murder when he was sentenced in 2007, the first sentence for second degree murder 
was vacated, thus the consecutive nature of his sentences vanished where there was 
no sentence to which the aggravated battery could be consecutive.  Upon his 
resentencing in 2014, the district court did not specify that the second degree murder 
was consecutive to the aggravated battery, thus, the sentences are concurrent.  
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court remand the case with an order for the 
district court to issue a corrected Amended Judgment of Conviction which clarifies that 
the sentences are to be served concurrently and which gives Mr. Adams the requisite 
credit for time served on the aggravated battery. 
    
B.  Standard Of Review 
      A determination as to “[w]hether the district court properly applied the law 
governing credit for time served is a question of law over which” appellate courts 
exercise free review.  State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006).  On appeal, 
the appellate court will “defer to the district court’s findings of fact, however, unless 
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record 
and are therefore clearly erroneous.”  Id.  
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C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Adams’ Motion For Credit For Time 
Served  
 
In 2007, Mr. Adams’ sentence on the conviction for aggravated battery was 
ordered to be served consecutively to the conviction for second degree murder.  (5/8/07 
Tr., p.112, L.24 – p.113, L.13.)  In 2013, the first sentence for second degree murder 
was vacated by the district court’s summary dismissal and re-sentencing orders as part 
of Mr. Adams’ petition for post-conviction relief (R.42920, pp.1894-1895, 1908-1909, 
1933), whereupon the consecutive nature of his sentences vanished as there was no 
sentence to which the aggravated battery could be consecutive.  When Mr. Adams was 
re-sentenced for the second degree murder charge in 2014, the district court did not 
specify whether the new second degree murder sentence was consecutive to, or 
concurrent to, the aggravated battery charge.  (10/15/14 Tr., p.99, Ls.1-7.)   Because 
the second degree murder sentence was imposed after the aggravated battery 
sentence, the only way the sentences could be consecutive is if the district court said so 
during its oral pronouncement at the re-sentencing.  However, while the district court did 
attempt to incorporate the aggravated battery sentence into the 2014 written Amended 
Judgment of Conviction (R.42667, p.130; R., p.32), this was ineffective for the reasons 
discussed below. Because the aggravated battery charge had ceased to be consecutive 
once the second degree murder was vacated, and because such an incorporation was 
contrary to the oral pronouncement of sentence, the sentences are concurrent and 
Mr. Adams is owed credit for time served for the aggravated battery conviction. 
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1. The Consecutive Nature Of The Aggravated Battery Ceased Once The 
Second Degree Murder Sentence Was Vacated For Re-Sentencing 
 
 In 2007, the district court first imposed the sentence for second degree murder 
and then sentenced Mr. Adams on the aggravated battery conviction.  (5/8/07 
Tr., p.112, L.24 – p.113, L.13; R., pp.33-34.)  The district court ordered the aggravated 
battery sentence be served consecutively to the second degree murder sentence.  
(5/8/07 Tr., p.112, L.24 – p.113, L.13; R.42667, p.62.)  The sentence for second degree 
murder was subsequently vacated by the district court’s orders after Mr. Adams 
prevailed on two of his post-conviction claims.  (R.42920, pp.1894-1895, 1908-1909, 
1933.)  When the first sentence, the one that the aggravated battery sentence was 
consecutive to, vanished, so did the consecutive nature of the aggravated battery 
sentence.  A consecutive sentence must be tied to, or consecutive to, another sentence.   
 Similar to the facts of State v. Teal, 105 Idaho 501, 505 (Ct. App. 1983), 
Mr. Adams’ Amended Judgment of Conviction incorporated the aggravated battery 
sentence from the original Judgment of Conviction, and, like the Teal Court, this Court 
should find that phrases within a Judgment dictating a legally impossibility are 
surplusage and should be stricken to avoid confusion.  As the Teal Court found: 
Thus, once one sentence had been imposed, the court was free to exercise 
its discretion by ordering the second sentence to be served consecutive to 
the first. Here, however, the district court, in the original judgment and 
sentence in each case, made each sentence consecutive to the other. As 
noted at the outset of this opinion, the forgery sentence (Docket No. 1024) 
was the first pronounced. At that point, there was no other sentence to which 
the term “consecutive” could apply. Therefore, the phrase “said five (5) year 
term is to run consecutively with the sentence in Minidoka County Case No. 
1026” is surplusage and should be stricken to avoid confusion. 
Teal, 105 Idaho at 505. 
 
 9 
A period of incarceration cannot be ordered consecutive to a sentence that had 
not yet been pronounced, or had been pronounced but vacated, or even pronounced 
but reversed.  In Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1894), a term of 
imprisonment under a judgment on the third count of an indictment was stipulated to 
commence upon the expiration of the judgment on the first count, and the judgment on 
the first count was reversed because of error.  The United States Supreme Court held 
that the term of imprisonment on the third count should commence on the date 
imprisonment to begin on the first count.  Blitz, 153 U.S. at 317-18; see also Kite v. 
Com., 52 Mass. 581, 585 (Mass. 1846) (holding that a consecutive sentence is legal; 
and “[i]f the previous sentence is shortened by a reversal of the judgment, or a pardon, 
it then expires; and then, by its terms, the [subsequent] sentence in question takes 
effect, as if the previous one had expired by lapse of time.”) 
 The sentence on the second degree murder was vacated.  When it was vacated 
for re-sentencing, the second sentence for aggravated battery became the only 
sentence.  It could thusly not be served consecutive to any other sentence, for no other 
sentence existed. 
   
2. Upon Mr. Adams’ Re-Sentencing, The Second Degree Murder Sentence 
Was Concurrent To The Aggravated Battery Sentence 
 
Mr. Adams’ second degree murder sentence is concurrent with the aggravated 
battery sentence where, at re-sentencing, the district court did not specify whether the 
second degree murder sentence was to be served concurrently with or consecutive to 
any other sentence, thus, the second degree murder sentence could only be 
concurrent. 
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Idaho case law holds that if the trial court does not specify whether a sentence is 
to be served concurrently or consecutive to another sentence, the sentence will be 
concurrent.  State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 In State v. Allen, 144 Idaho 875 (Ct. App. 2007), the Idaho Court of Appeals held: 
Under Idaho law, “the only legally cognizable sentence in a criminal case 
is the ‘actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant.’  The 
legal sentence consists of the words pronounced in open court by the 
judge, not the words appearing in the written order of commitment.”   
 
Id. 144 Idaho at 877-878 (internal citations omitted) (holding that, where the sentence in 
the amended judgment did not comport with the sentence pronounced at the sentencing 
hearing, the oral pronouncement controlled and the district court’s contrary intent did 
not).   
The subsequent Amended Judgment and Commitment provided “that the 
sentence previously imposed on May 6, 2007, with regards to the charge of Aggravated 
Battery in Count II, and as set forth in the Judgment and Commitment filed May 15, 
2007, shall remain as reflected in said judgment.”  (R., p.32.)  However, the district 
court’s attempt to integrate the previously imposed sentence was ineffective for two 
reasons:  (1) the oral pronouncement controls, thus, any attempt to modify the 
sentences by correcting or altering the sentences in a written order was invalid; and (2) 
in order to have the sentences be consecutive, the district court was required to make 
the later-imposed sentence (the second degree murder) consecutive to the sentence 
imposed first (the aggravated battery) once the sentence was orally pronounced on the 
defendant.   
In State v. Searcy, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the oral pronouncement 
of a corrected sentence did not prevail over a subsequent written recitation of the 
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sentence that was consistent with the original sentence.  124 Idaho 107, 112 (Ct. App. 
1993).  However, in Searcy the hearing was held to correct a defect in the sentencing 
by rescinding one of the two sentencing enhancements, not to sentence the defendant 
anew.  Id.  Thus, it is distinguishable from the facts of Mr. Adams’ case, where the 
district court vacated the sentence on the second degree murder charge, and then 
sentenced Mr. Adams anew.  That is, once the second degree murder charge was 
vacated, the aggravated battery was consecutive to nothing.  It was therefore no longer 
a consecutive sentence, it was concurrent.  His resentencing in 2014 could not alter the 
nature of the aggravated battery sentence. 
Where the district court did not specify that the second degree murder was 
consecutive to the aggravated battery the oral pronouncement controls, and the 
sentences are concurrent.  
  
3. Mr. Adams Is Entitled To Credit For Time Served On The Aggravated 
Battery Since His 2007 Sentencing 
 
When the aggravated battery sentence that was initially ordered to be served 
consecutive to the second degree murder sentence became concurrent, the aggravated 
battery sentence became wholly concurrent from the date the sentence was imposed in 
2007.  Thus, credit is owed to Mr. Adams’ aggravated battery sentence from 
approximately 2007 to present because a sentence cannot be partly consecutive and 
partly concurrent. 
“A sentence is either consecutive to or concurrent with another sentence, but 
never both. A singular sentence simply cannot be partially concurrent and partially 
consecutive to another sentence.”  Mickelsen v. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352, 
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355 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis in original) (holding that district court’s modification of 
defendant’s sentences from being served consecutively to concurrently applied 
retroactively to date sentences were imposed, and thus, defendant was entitled to have 
credit for time served applied to sentences as though they were concurrent when 
originally imposed). 
In Mickelsen, the district court modified the defendant’s sentences from 
consecutive to concurrent; however, the Idaho Department of Correction failed to alter 
its credit for time served calculation to reflect the district court’s modification.  
Mickelsen v. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352 (Ct. App. 1998).  The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the Department had to treat Mickelsen's sentences as though they 
were imposed concurrently ab initio, i.e. as of May 30, 1991, and the time Mickelsen 
served in prison had to be credited to both offenses.  Id. at 356.  The Court reversed 
and remanded the case for recomputation of Mickelsen’s credit for time served dating 
back to his original judgment of conviction. 
Here, the facts show that Mr. Adams’ sentences are concurrent, and that he is 
entitled to additional credit for time served on each count for which he received a 
sentence; thus, the district court erred when it denied his request for credit for time 
served.   The supporting documentation submitted by Mr. Adams show he is entitled to 
nearly nine years of credit for time served on the aggravated battery charge.  (R., p. 30.) 
This Court should hold that Mr. Adams is entitled to have his sentences treated as 
though they were imposed concurrently ab initio, i.e. as of May 8, 2007, and the time 
Mr. Adams has served in prison must be credited to both offenses.  Mickelsen, 131 
Idaho at 356.  
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  Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court remand the case with an order 
for the district court to issue a corrected Amended Judgment of Conviction which 
clarifies that the sentences are concurrent and which gives Mr. Adams the 
corresponding credit for time served on the aggravated battery, approximately 3,333 
days, or nine years and one month from the May 8, 2007 sentencing hearing to the date 
of this Appellant’s Brief.    
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court order the Amended Judgment be 
corrected and that he be given credit against each sentence for all time he spent in 
custody.   
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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